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MOTIVATIONAL TRAINING IN COUNTERINSURGENCY A PROPOSAL

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INTRODUCTION

The history of human warfare is studded with striking examples of the importance of motivation, by whatever name it is called -- spirit, drive, will-to-win, morale, or esprit de corps. It has often, perhaps usually, been the deciding factor in battle, and there are examples of its triumph over fearful physical disadvantages, from the rear-guard action of Leonidas at Thermopylae to such modern examples as the astonishing charge of General Thomas Union forces up the near-vertical slope at Chicamauga, or the R.A.F. heroism in the Battle of Britain.

While inspired leadership has often played an important part in bringing fighting spirit to a peak, good motivation has generally been solidly based upon such intrinsic factors as national feelings, determination to defend one's home, and opposition to a foreign ideology — feelings, in short, which were the result of years of conditioning, and led to a strong sense of "we" against "they" at the outset.

In Viet-Nam, however, as many observers have pointed out, this conditioning is lacking. The soldier who fights for the government, like the peasant upon whom he depends for support, has not been conditioned by years of loyalty to a recognized national government. He does not have the advantage of defending his homeland against a foreign invader. He is not enticed by the prospect of glory and conquest. He is, in fact, a peasant himself, whose traditional horizons have encompassed little more than his own village or region, and whose cultural traditions have not prepared him for passionate devotion to abstract ideas.

It is this man who is being asked to risk his life for a remote government in a struggle against other Vietnamese, in the name of anti-communism.

And the Communist-trained enemy is a man who has been the (more or less willing) subject of intensive indoctrination appealing to his patriotism (against the Americans), his land-hunger, and his traditional dislike of the central government.

This is the problem we face in Viet-Nam, but it also has wider implications for those who have observed Communist ambitions elsewhere in Southeast Asia, in Latin America, and in Africa, where many or all of the same peasant characteristics exist, and where conditions are ripe for "wars of liberation."

In theory and practical experience, the advantage so far appears to be with the Communists, who have applied themselves systematically to the indoctrination of masses of unsophisticated folk, and have

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learned from their experience. Nothing can be more clear than the need for the Free World to catch up in this area of endeavor, and the usefulness for this purpose of learning from the Communists themselves.

This paper describes one project in indoctrination or motivational training, as the author puts it, in which both the theory and the techniques used by the Communists in their "wars of liberation" and set forth in their literature by Mao and others, are applied to an intensive effort to win minds for the anti-Communist cause in South Viet-Nam.

This effort will not be a painless one. Americans will have to give up some deeply-ingrained habits of thought and operation. Where we are accustomed to dealing in broad principles and their equal application, we shall have to be willing to start instead with the particular, the concrete and the local and deal with these as we find them. Where we are accustomed to treating everyone alike, we shall have to apply ourselves to the formation of cadres, with special training, special responsibilities, and special privileges. Where we are used to dealing with a homogeneous soldiery, mobile and interchangeable, we must begin thinking of regional and religious ties. Where we are accustomed to communicating through mass media we must think instead in terms of personal contact. And where we are accustomed to thinking in terms of groups of people in functional or professional units, we must instead think of them in terms of the land and the locality to which they are bound — as villages and districts.

In this connection one finds in this paper many echoes from "Advice for the Americans from a South Vietnamese," (M-211-65, IRS/AF June 1, 1965) in which we are urged to "accomplish the political education of the people, organize all the anti-Communist villages on the model of the Israeli kibbutz. That was what was done when the Vietnamese fought against the Mongol invasion. The fighters were organized by villages ..." (Emphasis added.)

Because he feels his approach has application elsewhere, the author has divorced his account as much as possible from time and place, and described his project in terms which will enable it to be used in other places. In its attention to theory, its wealth of concrete detail, and not least in the refinements which have come from actual experience in the field, this essay will, it is hoped, provide a useful contribution to a growing body of literature on the grass-roots struggle with communism in the underdeveloped areas of the world.

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MOTIVATIONAL TRAINING IN COUNTERINSURGENCY:

A specific and easily understood program of motivational training should be developed according to the following principles:

Study the revolutionary situation. The best statement on this need is found in Strategy in China's Revolutionary War by Mao Tse-Tung. He points out that each national revolutionary war has its own nature and characteristics. Those who wish to win the struggle in a particular circumstance must study and thoroughly understand that situation. Friends from other areas can offer an exchange of interesting experiences; but more highly valued are the lessons learned with one's own blood and exertion. Those who design the motivation program then, must define the characteristics of the situation prevailing in the country.

Consider the characteristics of the personnel receiving motivational training. The nature of each force is different according to mission and tactic of operation. The administering cadre must know the ethnic composition, religious composition, ages, and educational experience of the trainees. Cadre should be aware of the political background of the personnel receiving training. Knowledge of all these factors, as well as previous level of military training, is necessary to tailor the program to the unit being trained.

Determine for what purpose the motivational training has been developed. This will relate to some extent with the unit's operational mission. The program could answer the general problem of improving individual behavior and commitment to his task; or be addressed to security practice, new operational procedures, or other technical problems. The program may be aimed towards more than one purpose, but it must be problem-oriented. This is true regardless of the nature of the personnel receiving training.

Decide upon a training method. There are, in general, two possible approaches: (1) lecture, or (2) guided cell discussion. The lecture methodology has the advantage of simplicity and speed for organization. Its principal weakness is the difficulty in obtaining a reading or understanding, by the trainee, of the problems and conclusions presented. The guided cell discussion is the most satisfactory methodology but depends entirely upon the availability of a skilled instructional cadres. In practice a combination of the two techniques is sometimes employed.

<u>Determine the program content</u>. To some degree determination of content is dependent upon the first three points: what is the situation, who is being trained, and what are they being trained for. The

content of the program helps determine the length of the instructional period and the nature of the instructional cadre assigned to the program. The content of the program must be related to ideology.

<u>Provide for special recommendations</u>. These recommendations may pertain to suggestions on dealing with points of detail or instructions necessary to the implementation of the training program.

EXAMPLE OF A PROGRAM FOR MOTIVATIONAL TRAINING:

As applies among District Para-Military Forces in a Province of Central Viet-Nam During 1965.

The Situation

The province was occupied by the enemy during the period 1945 through 1954 and political indoctrination by the Viet Minh was so extensive that inhabitants commonly employ political vocabulary in ordinary conversation. Certain of the enemy's leaders were born in this province, lending the movement here a local popularity. A high percentage of the families in each hamlet have relatives serving with the enemy forces. Recently enemy elements native to this province, who had regrouped to North Viet-Nam in the post-1954 period, have returned to serve enemy forces as political and military cadres.

During the Viet Minh period of occupation while the enemy succeeded in obtaining the support of a part of the population, other inhabitants developed an antipathy to the Communists, however disguised. These people were generally rich and middle peasants, organized religious organizations (especially Cao Dai and Catholics), and disillusioned Viet-Minh participants. As a result, a number of the people of this province support the government as an alternative to return of Communist rule. As a rough index we can say that in this province forty percent of the population supports the enemy in some way, a further forty percent supports our forces, and the remainder are timidly neutral.

The armed strength of our forces is superior to the enemy on roughly a two to one ratio. However, the

enemy retains the military initiative due to dispersal of his forces over a wide area and the practice of attacking only under favorable circumstances. At the same time the enemy enjoys a certain political advantage. In the past, our cadre have sometimes performed in a manner which alienated the population. The enemy meanwhile, has been skillful in the employment of propaganda and exposition of policy. Further, the weight of responsibility for every situation bears upon the government, while the enemy's interest is to promote chaos. Recent storms and floods of six months past have destroyed many roads in the province. The government is responsible for maintaining the roads, but due to poor security the repair work progresses slowly.

The result of all these factors is that the population, while generally politically sensitive, is unresponsive to our presence except where it has been to its advantage to render support.

The Trainees

The units which will receive indoctrination are eighty-four platoons of district (county) level Paramilitary Forces. Each platoon is composed of thirty-eight ethnic Vietnamese between the ages of twenty and forty. Median age is twenty-seven. The formal education of the members of these units is low (one to three years of study on the average), but their political background is advanced. Roughly twenty percent of the personnel have previous experience with either the Viet-Minh or the Force Populaire. According to the National Paramilitary Forces Headquarters, these units have an eight-point mission of pacification.

- 1. Protect the villages upon completion of securing operations conducted by regular forces.
- 2. Conduct patrolling operations outside the boundaries of the hamlets.
- 3. Provide initial reinforcement to hamlets under attack.

- 4. Participate in operations outside the assigned village area only in exceptional cases as part of a district mobile operation.
- 5. Maintain public order and security in the village and hamlets and oppose subversion and terrorism.
- 6. Furnish information and intelligence data pertaining to the enemy's troop situation to regular and other paramilitary forces on operations conducted in the local area.
- 7. Assist the population with civic action projects, and during periods of distress caused by natural disaster.
- 8. Protect public buildings and places when they constitute an integral part of the village complex.

These units have previously posed serious problems due to poor behavior toward the local population. Discipline is weak. Items of support equipment have been unevenly distributed to the individual soldiers. As a result, morale is low. The previous military training is adequate and all personnel are armed. Weapons are not, however, uniform issue and some attention should be given to this matter.

Aims of the Training Program

The district paramilitary forces are the largest armed units in close and continuing association with the people. These units are involved in a military struggle against the enemy. In addition, however, this training program proposes to give political motivation and training so that the platoons will be able to wage political war against the enemy. In this way the enemy infra-structure will be threatened, and enemy forces can be exposed to battle. This objective involves six district tasks:

- 1. Improve the combat potential of the units.
- 2. Assist the soldier to see himself as a vital link between the people and the government, necessary to the welfare of both.

- 3. Encourage support for the local government.
- 4. Develop confidence between the people and soldiers to permit joint participation in construction and defense of a stable community.
- 5. Promote the idea of participation in civic affairs.
- 6. Develop capability for personal propaganda.

Method

Five cadres will work with each training cycle. A platoon is to be divided into its three squads when it enters motivational training. There will be one instructor with each squad. In addition, another cadre must serve as supply and finance officer for the duration of the course. The fifth cadre serves as the Course Coordinator.

The method of instruction is through guided-cell discussion. For the purpose of motivational training, each squad will serve as a study cell. The task of the squad leader is to assist the instructor assigned to the squad.

In this way discipline is retained and a competitive spirit promoted among squads. The squad leader further assists through encouraging members in study and expression of thought. The squad leader is responsible for security of the cell, operating under the direction of the Unit Commander and the Course Coordinator.

The role of the instructor is to guide discussion so as to cover the required points and arrive at previously-determined conclusions. However, the trainees should feel that the results are their freely-arrived-at decisions. The instructor will serve as a kind of tutor. He will not lecture, but assist the squad members to study and express their own opinion. In the squad discussion, the instructor summarizes the main points and helps everyone to agree. Serious deviations from the course conclusions should be noted and reported to the Course Coordinator. At a general meeting of all three squads, the panel of instructors will

explain and rectify the misunderstanding. The instructors exemplify a democratic spirit. They eat, work, and live with the trainees on an equal basis. Through sharing the same living conditions, they develop fraternal spirit which aids in exchange of ideas.

The motivational training is accomplished not in some central place, but in the hamlets of the District. This immediately emphasizes the popular nature of the struggle. From the first day of training, the soldiers must, in Mao's words, "swim with the people." Trainees sleep either on the ground or in the homes of the people. The study will cover about six hours each day. The unit provides its own security during the training period and moves to a different hamlet every three or four days. This serves as an aid in preserving security, as well as in promoting habits of mobility.

There are four important principles related to the methodology of guided-cell discussion as a form of training.

The first principle is to see study in, and with, the squad as essential. Members are involved in a continuing relationship among themselves and the squad leader, as well as with the instructor. As part of a small group, an individual's ability to discuss course problems can be carefully examined. Having expressed his own opinion, a trainee will be interested in the opinions of others, at least with respect to his own expressed thought. Through taking notes of the discussion the trainee provides, in effect, his own lesson plans.

The second important principle is for the instructor to control the daily effort of the trainees. The squad leader and instructor must be sure each trainee understands the lesson. Shortcomings must be rectified. Through frequent oral questions and short examinations, the trainees are helped to check their own progress. The instructors strive to keep the lesson material simple in content and easily related to local experience.

The third principle is to combine the different points of view and arrive at a common belief.

This might be the most difficult task for the instructors. After the squad's study session, the instructor must combine all comments into a document which represents the conclusion to which all have contributed. The lesson is then discussed at a general meeting of all the squads. The instructors have the opportunity to emphasize principal points, and the trainees can clarify or modify points of view.

The fourth important principle of this methodology is to operate on the basis of full and honest discussion. The problems of national, political and economic life must be squarely faced. The instructors must be prepared to discuss realistic solutions to the problems discussed.

The content of the training program is organized around a twelve day cycle. Special emphasis is placed upon the war in Viet-Nam. Through national and local history, the enemy is interpreted as an agent of external aggression. Unification of all the nation is discussed as an ultimate goal. This makes defeat of the enemy in the south of first priority. Achievement of this first step will see the establishment of the south as a base for reunification. The present government under which we function is a growing and developing structure from which we are determined to draw democracy.

Toward the conclusion of the training cycle, the members of the platoon will elect a platoon member to serve as the unit political warfare cadre. The function of this man will be to continue the procedure of self-criticism and internal unit evaluation which has been initiated in the training cycle. The elected political warfare cadre, having the expressed confidence of fellow unit members, will strive to help them live according to the rules of the unit. This cadre within the unit is responsible for implementation of popular propaganda with the people, psychological warfare against the enemy, and morale of the unit. The election is free and guided by the instructional cadre. In the future when instructional cadre return to visit and inspect the unit as it is operational, they help the unit cadre to resolve motivational problems.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAM

In the beginning it is absolutely necessary to obtain the understanding and cooperation of the provincial and district officials. Their assistance is fundamental, not only to the training period, but to proper subsequent employment of the unit as well.

The instructional cadre and those who have developed the program should first discuss all facets of the project with the Chief of Province. His opinions and advice should be solicited. All his questions should be answered before, under his auspices, a meeting is held with the District Chiefs.

At the meeting of the District Chiefs, the Chief of Province should explain the program to his personnel. The instructional cadre will be available to answer questions. Problems of supply and finance should be discussed and resolved at this meeting. By the conclusion of the session, everyone should have been made to understand what items of equipment will be issued in conjunction with the training program, and how the daily ration allowance will be issued.

At the district level, selection of personnel for the initial unit is critical. Although the program aims to train all District Paramilitary Forces in the province, the first unit in each district will be a model for those which follow. The initial platoon in each district should set the highest possible standard, toward which other units aspire. The model unit may be an already-existing platoon or a recently-organized elite.

The first day's program will be largely administrative in nature. The opening ceremony should be brief. Arrangements should be made for some items of equipment to be issued by the District Chief and the instructional cadre. At the outset this demonstrates good faith on the part of the government. The District Chief, in addition, should speak to the troops briefly to tell them how important they are, and that this course has been developed to help them.

Following the opening ceremony, when the instructors introduce the program to the units, every effort should be made to obtain an informal atmosphere. The instructor stresses that he is there to help the members of the unit.

During the first day each man writes an autobiography, and, in addition, may be asked to write the answers to three or four questions posed to the unit by the instructors. It is explained that at the conclusion of the course these will be returned to the soldiers, as the instructors want them only for the purpose of knowing the men, and

understanding their problems and aspirations. When he reads the biography, the instructor looks for such things as evidence of voluntary service in the unit and problems or grievances indicated by the writer, in order that he may address himself to these problems during the training period. Writing the biography also assists the individual towards exposition of his ideas.

At the close of the training cycle there will be a concluding ceremony. The unit should develop this ceremony themselves with guidance from the instructional cadre. In this way the ceremony will be especially meaningful to the unit. Some units have finished training with an afternoon ceremony to which all the hamlet population is invited. These units take an oath of loyalty to all the people of the nation. The District Chief often joins the unit ranks for the loyalty oath. Other units have held impressive evening ceremonies where the unit members pledge allegiance to the memory of slain comrades. The form of the ceremony is a question for the unit to decide. All ceremonies must be impressively solemn.

The establishment of a model unit in each of the six districts is the first phase of the program aiming at motivational training for all the District Paramilitary Forces of the province. Accomplishment of the first phase will necessitate three months.

The second phase begins in the fourth month when the instructional cadre return to the first district. While training two additional platoons there, a team of district cadre is also trained to serve as instructors. During the fifth month the district cadre continue to train additional platoons in that district while the parent instructional cadre move to the second district to repeat the process. The fourth through the ninth month, then, will see the establishment in each district of a team of instructors. During this period the presence of a model platoon, created during months one through three, in each district will serve as a reminder of the high standards set by the program. Since in each district a team of instructors will continue to train platoons, ten months after initiation of this program, sixty platoons will have completed training. The remaining twenty-four units, of the projected eighty-four, will complete training during the eleventh and twelfth months.

At this point the parent instructional cadre will be available for duty elsewhere. The teams of district cadre will serve as an inspectorate and retraining staff for the operational units. Inspection will serve to maintain the vitality of the program by injecting new ideas into the units and acting as a grievance-mechanism for the soldiers. The introduction of an inspectorate is not merely for purposes of control. The cadre serving as inspectors will serve to encourage the units, help resolve new problems faced by them, and assist the soldiers

in learning from shared experiences. Monthly and special action reports provide only one channel of communication. There is no substitute for frequent personal contact. Those who supervise the activity of Paramilitary Forces must be stirred by the same spirit of sacrifice and adventure which we hope motivates the units themselves.

COURSE OUTLINE FOR THE PROGRAM

The reader should remember that the items presented in the outline are <u>discussion</u> topics and not lecture topics. Statements in the outline are conclusions towards which the trainees are guided by the instructor. The conclusions are stated by the soldiers in their own words.

FIRST DAY

MORNING: (GENERAL MEETING)

- 1. Opening Ceremony
- 2. Introduction of Instructors.
- 3. Formation of Squads.
- 4. Determination of Squad leaders as cell leaders.
- 5. Explanation of course.
 - a. Significance of Paramilitary Forces
 - b. Three purposes:
 - (1) Propaganda
 - (2) Intelligence
 - (3) Combat
 - c. Importance of work.
 - d. Characteristics of work.

AFTERNOON: (SQUADS)

- 1. Distribution of note books and pens.
- 2. Explanation on writing biographies
- 3. Writing biographies in cells.
- 4. Distribution of soldier's handbook (on instructional training and demonstrating patrol and ambush tactics).

EVENING:

Discussion in study groups.

SECOND DAY

MORNING: (SQUADS)

TOPIC: VIET-NAM HISTORY AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 1945-1954 ANTI-FRENCH STRUGGLES

- 1. Where the Viet people came from.
- 2. Establishment in North
- 3. Struggles with China.
- 4. Independence and Expansion.
- 5. Conquest by French and Early Resistance.
- 6. French Role: Divide and Conquer.
- 7. World War II and Viet Minh.
- 8. Defeat of the French and Role of the Population.

AFTERNOON: (SQUADS)

TOPIC: PRESENT ANTI-COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

- 1. Viet Minh Steal Revolution of Nation.
- 2. Communists Conspire to Divide Nation.
- 3. Viet Cong Movement.
- 4. Who Are the Viet Cong?

EVENING:

Discussion in Study Groups.

THIRD DAY

MORNING: (SQUADS)

TOPIC: THE ENEMY'S POSITION AND OUR OWN

- 1. International Communism and the Viet Cong.
- 2. Expansion through Force.
- 3. Contradictions in Communism.
- 4. International Free World.
 - a. Democracy: Unity in Diversity.
 - b. Different Roads to Democracy.
- 5. Establishment of Democracy in our country.
- 6. Unification.
- 7. Assistance of Friendly Nations.

AFTERNOON: (GENERAL MEETING)

Question and Answer Period. Anecdotes of Past Experience.

EVENING:

Discussion and Relaxation.

FOURTH DAY

MORNING: (SQUADS)

TESTING OF TRAINEES ON TOPICS TO DATE; INSTRUCTORS MEET TO DISCUSS COURSE PROGRESS

AFTERNOON: (SQUAD)

TOPIC: Role of Population.

- 1. Control and Leadership of Population as Objective.
- 2. Population Attitude As Key Factor in Determining Victory or Defeat.
- 3. Handicaps of Regular Forces in Bringing Victory.
 - a. Mobile -- divorced from people.
 - b. Emphasis on Hunting and Killing Enemy.
- 4. Ourselves -- We Are the People.

EVENING:

Relaxation.

FIFTH DAY

MORNING: (SQUADS)

Continuation of Previous Topic with an Emphasis on Shortcomings and Mistakes in Endeavors to Win over Population.

- 1. Local Authority Mistakes.
- 2. Personal Mistakes (self-criticism).
- 3. Consequences of Mistakes.
- 4. Winning Respect, and Our Behavior

AFTERNOON: (SQUADS)

Review of previous topics:

- 1. Relating Purpose of this Unit to Problem.
- 2. Improvement of Individual Attitudes.
- 3. Development of a Personal Code of Conduct.

EVENING: (SQUADS)

Discussion of Anecdotes Related to Topics.

SIXTH DAY

MORNING: (GENERAL MEETING)

DISCUSSION OF ROLE OF POPULATION, AND OUR ATTITUDE; ANSWERING QUESTIONS.

AFTERNOON: (SQUADS)

TOPIC: PROPAGANDA: WHAT IS IT?

- 1. By Word to Discredit the Enemy.
 - a. Talking with Every Family.
 - b. Need to Know the People's Attitude.
- 2. Deeds which Win Respect for Ourselves.
 - a. Avoidance of Making Promises.
 - b. Performance of immediate jobs right away.
- 3. Role of Viet-Nam Information Service.

EVENING:

Squad Discussions Between Trainees and Instructors.

SEVENTH DAY

MORNING: (GENERAL MEETING)

Discussion of Problems and Attitudes Revealed in Autobiographies.

AFTERNOON: (SQUADS)

Testing of Trainees on Topics to Date.

EVENING: Relaxation.

EIGHTH DAY

MORNING: (GENERAL MEETING)

DISCUSS: Role of Paramilitary Forces.

- 1. Meaning of Term.
- 2. Our Standards.
- 3. Reasons why we Fight.

AFTERNOON: (SQUADS)

Discussion of Four Principles

- 1. Respect for the people.
- 2. Help to the people.
- 3. Protection for the people.
- 4. Following orders.

EVENING: Discussion and Relaxation.

NINTH DAY

MORNING: (SQUADS)

TOPIC: RESPONSIBILITIES OF PARAMILITARY FORCES AND PRIVILEGES.

AFTERNOON: (SQUADS)

TOPIC: METHOD OF OPERATION IN FIELD (See following section (c) Operation of the Unit).

EVENING: (SQUADS)

Discussion of above.

TENTH DAY

MORNING: (SQUADS)

TOPIC: ROLE OF THE CADRE

- 1. Character.
- 2. Attitude.
- 3. Conduct.

DISCUSSION OF EIGHT RULES:

- 1. Proper Speech and Behavior.
- 2. Fair Payment for Purchases.
- 3. Return of Everything Borrowed.
- 4. Compensation for Damages.
- 5. Avoidance of Mistreating the People.
- 6. Avoidance of Damage to Crops.
- 7. Avoidance of Mistreating Women.
- 8. Treating Prisoners Well.

AFTERNOON: (GENERAL MEETING)

- 1. Medical Examination if Available or Meeting with Members of Previously Trained Units, and Question Period.
- 2. Election of Unit Member as Unit Political Cadre. Unit Political Cadre to Continue the Procedure of Self-criticism Developed During the Training Cycle.

EVENING: (SQUADS)

Discussion of Above.

ELEVENTH DAY

MORNING: (GENERAL MEETING)

TO HEAR LECTURE ON INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING SITUATION IN THIS PROVINCE AND DISTRICT.

- 1. VC Government and Administration.
- 2. VC Intelligence.
- 3. VC Armed Forces.
- 4. VC Social Activity.
- 5. Methods Used by VC Forces.

AFTERNOON: (SQUADS)

TOPIC: RECOGNITION OF VC AGENTS AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A NET OF OUR FRIENDS

EVENING: Discussion and Relaxation.

TWELFTH DAY

MORNING: (SQUADS)

EXAMINATION ON COURSE TOPICS.

ISSUE OF EQUIPMENT.

AFTERNOON: (GENERAL MEETING)

Closing Ceremony.

OPERATION OF THE UNIT

The direction and responsibility for military control of the unit will remain with the district government guided by agreement reached in the preliminary meeting of the Province Chief with the District Chiefs.

Recognizing the importance of population control, the unit will operate in heavily-inhabited areas. There are three key terms which serve as points of reference for the unit. These are: popular propaganda, popular intelligence, and combat.

Popular Propaganda consists of the steps taken to win at least the respect, if not affection, of the population. The unit will employ propaganda by action (simple family and civic work) to promote credit for the unit, and, by implication, reflect favorably upon the government. The unit will employ verbal propaganda to discredit the enemy. Each family, in the hamlet a unit may operate in, will be visited by a member or members of the unit. The soldiers seek to know and understand the problems and aspirations of the people. Following this they attempt to help them solve the problems.

Popular Intelligence is intimately related to successful propaganda. Visiting each family, for example, in a hamlet, is only the first step towards establishment of a friendly intelligence net. If only a few families were customarily visited, the enemy would soon determine who was cooperating with the unit. Instead, the soldiers should visit even the families known to have members serving with the enemy. As intelligence becomes available the unit will know disposition, capability, and intention of the enemy.

Combat will derive from the process of functioning as an armed political unit. The unit will be threatening the enemy in the only

meaningful manner within a revolutionary war. The enemy, therefore, must seek to eliminate the unit, and when the attempt is made it will be our special units which are successful. The special unit will obtain victory because it has sought the enemy within the population, knows the population and area better than does the enemy, and has obtained the control or support of the population.

On operation the special unit merges with the population. The unit is mobile and the hamlet where the squads will sleep, even the area within the hamlet, is chosen at the last moment by the unit leader. The enemy may be aware that the special unit is in the area, but the exact location will be unknown. Some dispersion of the squads is encouraged to reduce possible mortar casualties. The sleeping area may be changed at any time.

The squad with picket duty should clear all details with the unit commander. The unit commander determines which squad takes a particular watch. The squad on detail will place four sentries within the hamlet around the sleeping area. The remainder patrol the adjacent area exterior to the hamlet. If contact with the enemy is obtained the picket squad will obstruct the enemy and report enemy strength and disposition to the unit commander. The unit stays with the people, forcing the enemy to come to them on disadvantageous terms. When the enemy retreats, the unit pursues with due caution for ambush.

The strategy of these Paramilitary Forces is to seek control of the population. In general, political operations take place by day and patrol and military operations are planned for night. But to obtain the aim of the strategy, the tactics must be suited to the place, hour, and problem. Flexibility of tactics is encouraged.

SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Special recommendations are four in number. These recommendations are the result of experience with Paramilitary Forces in a province with characteristics similar to the one described in this plan.

The first recommendation is that the equipment to be issued for a unit must be available prior to the beginning of a training cycle. The necessary funds to cover the daily ration expense must also be on hand. This precaution is not only a practical matter; it reflects, in the eyes of the trainees, upon the creditability of the instructional cadre as well. Items of equipment are governed by the conditions of Province logistics, but the recommended issue per man is: blanket,

poncho, canteen, mosquito bar, rucksack, boots, camouflage uniform, pistol belt, and black peasant's suit. Weapons will be supplied through the District, but great effort should be exerted for standardization.

The second recommendation is that basic financial and health policy be developed and executed for the benefit of the soldier and his family. Throughout the training course local authorities should show interest in trainee welfare. This interest must be continued as the unit becomes operational.

- a. The basic salary of the trainee should be increased by the amount necessary to purchase food for himself each month. The political cadre of each unit, elected by the unit members, will explain to the unit that this additional money must be used to purchase food from the people while the unit is mobile. This will tend to prevent theft of provisions from the population, and the concern shown for the unit by the authorities will contribute to morale.
- b. In the event that a member is killed, the family should receive a year's salary immediately. In addition the unit members will continue to demonstrate sympathy and concern for the family of a fallen comrade. They will assist the family in every way that they can. The family will continue to receive from the authorities the same privileges as formerly.
- c. The privileges extended to the soldier and his family relate to housing and education. In areas where the security level is minimal, the soldier may wish to resettle his family near the district headquarters. This step should be discouraged unless necessary. However it should be possible to provide each soldier with items of support, such as cement, to help him provide a better home for his family. Free public schooling should be provided for all the children of a soldier, for the survivors as indicated in the preceding section (b). The authorities may, if possible, assist the dependents in organizing at district headquarters a rice commissary which would permit them to purchase milled rice as cheaply as possible. Other benefits, such as health examinations, supply of medicines, and medical care for wounded, sick, or injured personnel should be guaranteed.

These three points of the second recommendation are not bribery for service rendered. They are reward for hardships suffered and a guard against excessive worry for the welfare of the family.

The third recommendation is that all of the instructional cadre should be native to the region, if possible from the province in which

they will function, and be representative of the principal religious communities of the province. Vietnamese society outside the cities is organized in terms of provinces. Differences of dialect are one evidence of regionalism, and often of cultural and political differences as well. The five principal regions are: the North (Hanoi and the Red River Delta), the Center (coastal provinces Nghe An to Binh Thuan) the South (Saigon and the Mekong Delta), the Northern Highlands, and the Southern Plateau. Our province is in the Central region, an area of especially difficult dialects; therefore, the instructional cadre must be Central in origin and preferably from this province. Representation of the principal religious communities, within the instructional cadre, will support explanations of the enemy's attempt to fracture society.

The final recommendation is that the cadre and local authorities make every effort to avoid abuse and mis-employment of the units trained. These units are trained for pacification and population control. Military action is a product of essentially political action. Where necessary the unit may be given a special military mission on a temporary basis, but constant military operations without attention to political factors constitute misuse of the unit. Experience in another province has demonstrated that both political and military success is maximum where the unit is employed for the purpose of population control and pacification. One unit killed more of the enemy in the period of a month than did the nearest regular army division. In another area three villages requested that the local unit stay in the area permanently and continue to work with the people. Popular intelligence doubled in the areas where these units operated. The units were successful in warfare because they were especially adapted to the local circunstances.